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Abstract. The widespread proliferation of US state incentives for film and television production 
led to a large number of evaluations of their economic impacts. The common assumption by 
economic impact studies that state and film production would not occur without the incentives 
has spurred interest in the academic literature. We review the academic empirical studies on the 
nexus between state incentives and economic activity in the film and television sector. We 
identify areas of strengths and weakness in the empirical literature and perform additional 
analysis of numerous states using the synthetic control method to fill in gaps of knowledge. An 
added contribution of the study is discussion of the economics of the empirical results that 
mostly is missing in the film incentive literature.   
1. Introduction 
Starting in the 1990s, the use of state financial incentives to create jobs spread to film and 
television production. Financial incentives for film and television production include tax 
credits/rebates for related expenditures, grants, and exemptions from state and local taxes 
(National Conference of State Legislatures, 2018). The practice quickly became widespread as 
forty-four states had film incentives in place at some point in time post-2000 (Bradbury, 2020a).1 
The value of incentives for film and television production in the nation exploded from $3 million 
in 2000 to $1.4 billion in 2010 (Tannenwald, 2010), expanding further to $2.13 billion in 2016 
(Thom, 2018a). Budgetary concerns and controversies have led at least thirteen states to end their 
incentive programs since 2009 (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2018).  
Several factors complicate precisely comparing the value of film incentives across states 
but key features can be identified though that allow for distinguishing the large incentive states 
from the small incentive states.2 Most states have limits or caps on the annual incentives that can 
be paid or require legislative approval of incentive expenditures (KPM Film, 2020). An 
exception is Georgia, which is the largest film and television incentive state with over 800 
 
1
 The states never having film incentives are Delaware, Idaho, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, and South 
Dakota. 
2
 The year of issuance of the incentive may differ from the year of the budget impact and this varies across states. 
States use differing forms of incentives, including tax forgiveness. Reporting practices regarding incentives differ 
across states and some are more transparent than others. 
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million dollars of expenditures in recent years (Bradbury, 2019). Other large incentive 
expenditure states, with total incentives or caps of at least 100 million dollars, include California, 
Connecticut, Illinois, Louisiana, New Mexico, and New York. States with caps or incentives of 
10 million dollars or less include Arkansas, Colorado, Montana, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, 
Nevada, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and Washington (National Conference of State 
Legislatures, 2018; KPM Film, 2020). 
As with incentives there is significant variation in the presence of film and television 
production across states. Labor market outcomes directly associated with the production 
primarily can be found in the Motion Picture and Video Industries category of the North 
American Industrial Classification System (NAICS 5121) (McDonald, 2011).3 Evaluations and 
studies of the film and television industry then typically focus on parts, or the whole, of the 
NAICS 5121 sector.  
The four-digit Motion Picture and Video Industries (NAICS 5121) category includes 
several six digit categories, most of which are export-oriented. Two of the sectors though 
primarily satisfy local demand and unlikely respond to incentives: NAICS 512131 (Motion 
Picture Theaters Except Drive-ins) and NAICS 512132 (Drive-in Motion Picture Theaters). The 
four six-digit categories of NAICS 5121 most likely to be affected by incentives include NAICS 
512110 (Motion Picture and Video Production), NAICS 512120 (Motion Picture and Video 
Distribution), NAICS 512191 (Teleproduction and Postproduction Services), and NAICS 
512199 (Other Motion Picture and Video Industries). NAICS codes 512110 and 512120 are the 
sole six-digit categories in the corresponding five digit categories of NAICS 51211 and 51212 
and can be used interchangeably. 
Table 1 displays US Bureau of Labor Statistics Quarterly Census of Employment and 
Wage data for the sum of the four NAICS six-digit industries most likely to be export related 
 
3
 A related NAICS sector (7115) is Independent Artists, Writers, and Performers. But the incentive effects on the 
sector can be captured as an input in Motion Picture and Video Industries (NAICS 5121) production using input-
output analysis in economic impact studies (Christopherson and Rightor, 2010; Loren C. Scott & Associates, 2017). 
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(512110+512120+512191+512199). For the US, Motion Picture, and Video Production (NAICS 
512110) comprises nearly ninety percent of the sums for both employment and wages. US 
employment in NAICS 512110 grew approximately thirty-six percent from 2001-2019, while it 
grew four percent in NAICS 512191 and contracted nearly thirty-three percent and thirty-nine 
percent in NAICS sectors 512120 and 512199.  
California, by far, contains the largest film and television presence in the nation, 
comprising approximately forty-six percent of the nation’s wage and salary payroll employment 
in the export-related sub-sectors. New York ranks second with nineteen percent of national 
employment, with Georgia a distant third at six percent. Other large incentive states such as 
Connecticut, Illinois, Louisiana, New Mexico also have a significant film and television 
production employment. The six states that never had incentives all have a small presence in the 
sector (Delaware, Idaho, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, and South Dakota) as do 
several of the small expenditure states (e.g., Arkansas, Kentucky, Maine, Montana, and 
Oklahoma) and those that eliminated their incentives (e.g., Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Vermont and 
Wyoming) (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2018). Despite eliminating its incentives 
in 2016, Florida ranks fourth. With its modest incentives, Texas ranks fifth.  
The average wage rate across the nation is $106,328 for the four export-related six-digit 
sectors, greatly exceeding the national average across all sectors of $59,219 according to the US 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. Twenty-two states have an average wage rate in the sector that 
exceeds the national wage rate across all sectors. Only California, Connecticut, New York, and 
Wyoming have a higher than average wage rate in the four export-related sectors. The footloose, 
high-paying, and clean production, nature of the film and television sector make it attractive for 
state financial incentives. 
Studies on the economic impacts of state film incentives are voluminous. Reviews of the 
studies reveal wide ranging conclusions, which often depend on whether a private or public 
entity conducts the study (Weiner, 2009; Christopherson and Rightor, 2010; Tannenwald, 2010). 
Among the common critiques of the studies is that they assume that all film production receiving 
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incentives is attributable to the incentives, or alternatively that incentives are responsible for all 
increases in film production post-incentive adoption. Economic impact studies of the incentives 
then apply multipliers from input-output models to the assumed direct spending by film and 
television productions to derive the estimated total economic impacts of the incentives. Some 
economic impact studies use the estimated total economic impacts to derive incentive costs of 
the jobs created and the return to state revenue from the incentive-induced economic activity. 
In response to the voluminous number of economic impact studies, an academic literature 
has emerged that tests the assumptions on the connection between incentives and production in 
the state film and television industry. The studies greatly vary along several dimensions in their 
attempts to identify a causal connection between incentives and film and television production. 
In this paper, we review the studies and assess their effectiveness in identifying the economic 
effects of state film incentives. Despite the apparent correlation between the size of incentive 
programs and size of the film and television sector across states discussed above, the empirical 
findings reviewed are inconclusive, often casting doubt on the efficacy of state film incentive 
programs. However, we note the incompleteness of the academic literature and implement 
additional empirical analysis of numerous states using the synthetic control method (SCM) to 
address the gaps in knowledge. A notable contribution of the empirical analysis is estimation of 
the impacts of both adopting and eliminating state film incentives, in contrast to prior case 
studies which have only examined the effects of adopting film incentives. We also evaluate the 
empirical findings within a broader and fuller economic policy context than currently found in 
the literature.  
In the next section, we critically review the empirical studies that attempt to estimate the 
causal relationship between incentives and economic activity for the state film and television 
industry. An assessment of what is learned from the studies and what remains unknown forms 
the basis for the empirical analysis in Section 3. Included in Section 3 is a discussion of what is 
learned from our empirical analysis about the nexus between incentives and state film and 
television activity and a fuller assessment of the economics of state film incentives. Although our 
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empirical results provide some support for the use of film incentives to stimulate state 
economies, state film incentives likely do not pay for themselves. Section 4 concludes the paper 
and discusses the implications for state film incentive policymaking. A primary conclusion is 
that the state policy context matters in the decision of whether to offer film incentives.  
2. Review of Academic Research on State Film Incentive Impacts 
The studies reviewed vary along several important dimensions in their approach and in their 
effectiveness in assessing what part of film and television production in a state is attributable to 
the incentives and what part would have occurred in the absence of incentives. Table 2 lists the 
studies, their geographic focus, the time period of analysis, the outcome variables examined and 
their measurement of film incentives. Table 3 lists the methods of analysis, primary empirical 
findings, and policy conclusions of the studies. The section concludes with discussion of the key 
takeaways from the academic literature. 
2.1 Focus of the Studies (Table 2) 
The studies most often focus on all or nearly all US states. Using a large number of states 
can provide an assessment of the overall, on-average, experience of states with film incentives. 
The larger sample also provides degrees of freedom for testing statistical significance of 
estimated effects. The disadvantage is the potential heterogeneity of state experiences. States 
differ in their physical, economic, and social characteristics, and in their incentive programs in 
ways that are difficult to fully measure and account for in pooled sample empirical analysis.  
To address the potential heterogeneity of experiences, Button (2018), Bradbury (2019) 
and Thom (2019) adopt the case study approach. Button (2018) focuses on Louisiana and New 
Mexico, which are amongst the earliest to adopt aggressive film incentives and have been noted 
as examples of successes. Thom (2019) likewise focuses on Louisiana, but also examines the 
experiences of Connecticut, Georgia, Massachusetts, and New York. All five are high incentive 
expenditure states, comprising seventy-seven percent of all expenditures in 2017 (Thom, 2019, p. 
94). Bradbury (2019) takes Georgia and North Carolina as case studies, with North Carolina as 
an early adopter of film incentives and Georgia the largest incentive expenditure state. Panel 
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studies of all states instead attempt to address heterogeneity by adding interaction variables to 
reflect the size of the industry in the state (Button, 2019) or omit states such as California and 
New York in sensitivity analysis (O’Brien and Lane, 2018; Thom, 2018b).  
The periods of analysis in the studies mostly include the years when film incentives 
became prevalent, starting in the late 1990s and extending at least several years, through 2017 in 
two of the studies (Button, 2019; Thom, 2019). Button (2018, 2019) includes many years prior to 
the adoption of film incentives in any state for comparison to the post-incentive adoption years. 
Use of all years, combined with use of all states (Swenson, 2017; Thom, 2018b; Button, 2019; 
Bradbury, 2020a), produces an average effect across a sample which contained early years where 
only a few states had film incentives and later years where nearly all states had film incentives. 
Case studies of individual states implicitly allow for varying effects across time in addition to 
across states. Adkisson (2013) divides states into early film incentive adopters, early followers, 
and late adopters in case study analysis. In sensitivity analysis, Button (2019) tests whether the 
timing of incentive adoption mattered for estimated outcomes. 
The studies also differ in the outcome variable or metric used to assess the effects of film 
incentives. Some studies use multiple measures, while others rely on a single measure. A few 
studies directly examine the number of films or television series that were produced in a state in 
response to incentives (Button, 2018, 2019; and Owens and Rennhoff, 2020). Because of 
potential non-residency of workers in the film and television industry and purchases of materials 
from out of the state, most studies advocate using government measures of employment, wages, 
or output in the state economy.  
The most commonly used labor market measures are employment, number of 
establishments, and wages and salaries for the Motion Picture and Video Production (NAICS 
51211) sector (Swenson, 2017; Button, 2018, 2019; Bradbury, 2019, 2020a). This is the sector 
believed primarily to be affected by film incentives as it is defined as activities “primarily 
engaged in producing, or producing and distributing motion pictures, videos, television 
programs, or television commercials” (North American Industry Classification System 2017, p. 
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415). The two primary sources of data used for the industry are solely for payroll employment 
and do not include proprietors: 1) US Bureau of Labor Statistics Quarterly Census of 
Employment and Wages (QCEW) and 2) US Census Bureau County Business Patterns (CBP). 
This leads to an understatement of the direct total employment effects of film incentives. Other 
sectors that may be related to incentives include: Independent Artists, Writers, and Performers 
(NAICS 7115); Motion Picture and Video Distribution (NAICS 51212); and Postproduction 
Services and Other Motion Picture and Video Industries (NAICS 51219). To the extent these 
activities are directly or indirectly affected by incentives the studies that do not consider them 
understate incentive effects.  
Other studies include measures of these related sectors either separately or as part of an 
aggregated sector. Button (2019) includes payroll-based measures of several detailed sectors 
highlighted in economic impact studies as related to the film and television industry, including 
NAICS 7115. Adkisson (2013) examines NAICS codes 51211-51219, which includes 
establishments in Motion Picture and Video Production, Distribution, Exhibition, Post-
Production, and other services. Thom (2018b) focuses on employment, gross state product, and 
wages and salaries in the aggregate sector Motion Picture and Sound Recording Industries, 
NAICS 512, which includes the aggregate (four-digit) NAICS sectors of Motion Picture and 
Video Industries and Sound Recording Industries. More published data sources exist for the 
aggregated sectors that more likely capture all activities affected by film incentives. But the more 
aggregated sectors also include activities that are highly unlikely to be affected by film 
incentives such as movie theaters (included in NAICS 51213) and sound recording studios 
(included in NAICS 5122). Oxford Economics (2017) reports almost no correlation between 
state-level QCEW employment in NAICS 51211 and BEA employment in NAICS 512 over the 
1998-2013 period, suggesting the aggregate measure is a poor metric for estimating the effects of 
film incentives. Because of the relatively small size of the film and television industry the 
problem becomes more acute when using metrics of the entire economy such as in Bradbury 
(2019, 2020a). Teasing out the impacts of a small industry on the overall state economy is 
8 
 
problematic because the effects can get overwhelmed by trends in other industries and other 
events that are nearly impossible to fully account for in empirical analysis. 
The most common method of measuring incentives is specification of a binary indicator 
variable that takes a value of 1 the year an incentive program is adopted or is in place. Some 
studies include additional binary variables indicating features of the incentive program such as 
whether tax credits are refundable or transferable, sales tax waivers, lodging tax waivers, and 
requirements of worker residency (Thom, 2018b; Bradbury, 2020a; Owens and Rennhoff, 2020). 
Thom (2018b) tests for the influence of incentive duration on outcomes. Case studies implicitly 
account for both features of incentive programs because of the specific programs in the places of 
study (Adkisson, 2013; Button, 2018; and Thom, 2019) and the influence of duration of the state 
incentive program. Thom (2019) uses the magnitude of incentive expenditures instead of binary 
indicator variables. 
2.2 Study Methodology, Findings and Conclusions (Table 3) 
The studies vary widely in the empirical methods used to identify the impacts of film 
incentives. There are recognized best practices in empirical economic research that improve 
identification of policy impacts that mimic what could be obtained from the outcomes of a 
randomized experiment (Reich, Allegretto and Godoey, 2017; Button, 2019). We discuss these 
practices and the extent the studies reviewed meet them. We then discuss the findings of the 
studies regarding the impacts of film incentive programs on select metrics. This is followed by 
policy conclusions reported in the studies.  
To establish the impacts of film incentives there should be detectable impacts in states 
that have them compared to states without incentives. The level or growth in the metric should 
change in a state when the film incentive program is adopted or is in effect relative to the change 
in the level or growth of the metric in states without incentives. The comparison across time for 




A common method used in DID for state film incentives is panel two-way fixed effects of 
all states over time (Swenson, 2017; Thom, 2018b; Bradbury, 2020a; Button, 2019). Measures of 
which states have film incentives and when they were in effect should reveal changes in levels or 
growth of the desired impact metric. One concern with the panel two-way fixed effects approach 
is the interpolation across states that are inherently different (Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller, 
2010). Attributing the estimated DID across states to a film incentive program can be biased by 
differences in state programs and characteristics that are difficult to measure and take into 
account. Panel two-way fixed effects models can include control variables to mitigate this 
concern (Thom, 2018b; Bradbury, 2020a; Button, 2019). But there still may be unmeasured 
differences and nonlinearities in relationships. Another way to address this concern is to establish 
that the metric examined behaves similarly across states prior to the enactment of incentives in 
some states (Button, 2019). If the metric behaves similarly, there is said to be parallel trends in 
the metric and unmeasured confounding factors are argued not to influence the estimated 
incentive impacts. 
An alternative approach is use of the synthetic control method (SCM) of Abadie, 
Diamond and Hainmueller (2010). In SCM, the comparison of a state with a film incentive 
program is to a weighted average or synthetic of other states that have similar characteristics and 
for which the metric behaves similarly prior to enactment of incentives. An additional advantage 
of SCM is the allowance of nonlinear incentive impacts. Button (2018) applies the SCM 
separately for Louisiana and New Mexico. One limitation of Button (2018) is the limited number 
of states that had not enacted a film incentive program that could be used for construction of the 
synthetic comparison and estimating statistical significance. Bradbury (2019) similarly applies 
the SCM approach to Georgia and North Carolina. 
Owens and Rennhoff (2020) implements a discrete choice model in assessing film 
location choices. The model includes several variables relating to physical and economic 
characteristics of geographic locations. The list of  characteristics is far from exhaustive and 
there is the possibility of omitted confounding factors.  
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Time series analysis of individual states that adopt film incentives do not provide 
comparisons to the experiences of states without them (Adkisson, 2013; Thom, 2019; Meares et 
al., 2020). Rather than a difference-in-differences comparison, i.e., differences across time after 
states have incentives compared to the same differences in states without incentives, the 
comparison is simply the difference across time in the states after they have incentives. Control 
variables can be added to capture industry and incentive trends elsewhere (Thom, 2019) but the 
lack of comparison to other appropriate states limits causal identification. 
Another empirical concern is the potential endogeneity of adoption of film incentives by 
states. If states that are doing well economically and not enduring fiscal stress, for example, more 
likely adopt film incentives (Sewordor and Sjoquist, 2016), then their estimated effects likely are 
upwardly biased. Only a few studies explicitly address this possibility. 
Use of the SCM approach mitigates endogeneity to the extent similar states are used for 
comparison, including similarity in the performance of the incentivized sector(s) prior to a state 
having a film incentive  program. Button’s (2018) use of SCM established similar pre-treatment 
paths of the selected metrics for each of Louisiana and New Mexico. But there is not any 
mention of the similarity of each state with its corresponding synthetic control unit in terms of 
characteristics that may affect the location of film production. Bradbury (2019) uses the 
characteristics from Reed (2009) that may affect overall state economic growth, but not 
characteristics more specific to the film production such as those examined in Owens and 
Rennhoff (2020). 
Bradbury (2020a) relies on instrumental variables estimation to address the endogeneity 
concern. The approach is based on the findings of Leiser (2017) regarding what best predicts 
whether a state will put a film incentive  program in place. Bradbury uses the age of a state’s film 
commission office and the percent of border states that have a film incentive  program to predict 
whether a state has a film incentive  program, removing economic considerations that could 
confound the estimated impacts.  
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Button (2019) argues that state fixed effects in panel studies control for persistent 
differences in economic conditions. But economic shocks occurred during the periods of analysis 
that differentially affected regions that could confound identification. Button also then separately 
adds state trend variables, adds control variables from both Leiser (2017) and Thom and An 
(2017), and drops California and New York in sensitivity analysis. The findings of the study are 
robust to these changes.  
Another concern is whether the outcomes in a state are affected by whether neighboring 
states have a film incentive  program (Sewordor and Sjoquist, 2016). SCM and panel two-way 
fixed effects models in default form ignore this possibility, invoking what is the so-called Stable 
Unit Value Assumption (Button, 2019). Unaccounted for spillovers can bias estimates of 
incentive impacts because changes in outcomes in a state are solely attributed to the incentives in 
the state. Button (2019) finds that allowing for spillovers from states with incentives onto their 
neighbors does not affect the main results of the study. 
The studies more likely find significant effects of film incentives on filming production 
than on labor market metrics. Owens and Rennhoff (2020) finds that film incentives significantly 
influence filming locations and that if all states eliminated their incentives filming would 
concentrate in a relatively few states. The study also finds refundable credits to have larger 
effects than transferrable credits because the latter are privately exchanged at a discount. They 
did not examine any labor market metrics. 
Button (2018) finds incentives in New Mexico to be associated with statistically 
significant increases in filming productions listed on the IMDb database and feature films listed 
on the Studio System database. Incentives in Louisiana only significantly increase feature film 
productions. In contrast, Button (2019) finds large effects on TV series filming across all states 
but not for feature film production. The estimated TV series effect occurs gradually over time, 
particularly in states with a medium or large existing industry size and is argued to likely persist 
after incentive repeal.  
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Case studies more likely report positive labor market effects than panel studies of all 
states. Adkisson (2013) reports that fairly equal numbers of states gained or lost employment in 
Motion Picture and Video Industries (NAICS 5121) after having incentives, which was true for 
early adopters of incentives, early followers, and late adopters. Button (2018) finds positive 
effects of film incentives on employment and the number of establishments in the Movie Picture 
and Video Production (NAICS 512110) sector for both Louisiana and New Mexico. But because 
of the limited number of states used in constructing the counterfactual comparison, the effects 
are not statistically insignificant. In contrast, across all states over time Button (2019) finds no 
evidence for positive effects on employment, wages, and the number of establishments in the 
Motion Picture and Video Production industry or in related industries, including in the sector 
comprised of independent artists, writers, and performers. Thom (2019) reports a statistically 
significant immediate positive effect on Motion Picture and Video Production employment in 
Connecticut, which the study attributes to the nontax component of incentives, and a statistically 
significant positive effect over time in Louisiana. No statistically significant effects are found for 
Georgia, Massachusetts, and New York. 
A common policy conclusion of the studies is that film incentives are a zero-sum game 
(Adkisson, 2013; Swenson, 2017). While incentives may shift filming activity across states, they 
are argued not to increase filming nationally. But this conclusion is primarily based on stable 
employment trends in national film production during the period of proliferation of state film 
incentives, ignoring developments outside of the US such as in Canada (Lester, 2013). The 
incentive dollar cost per job are reported to be large (Button, 2018) and the net revenue impacts 
reported to be negative (Owens and Rennhoff, 2020). The studies generally conclude that film 
incentives are not an effective economic development tool in terms of directly stimulating labor 
market outcomes. Button (2018) reports evidence that size of the industry matters for incentive 
effectiveness, suggesting agglomeration economies in the film industry. O’Brien and Lane 
(2018) finds that organizational diversity and dominance increases filming activity and 
associated number of jobs and establishments, though this is based on the NAICS 5121 
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aggregate, which includes businesses that might not be incentivized such as movie theaters 
(Bradbury, 2020b). Owens and Rennhoff (2020) did not assess whether the incentive effect on 
film production varied by size of the industry. 
2.3 Takeaways from the Academic Research 
Despite striking differences in methodology across the studies reviewed there are a 
number of key takeaways. There also are unanswered questions and under-addressed issues. The 
evaluation of state film incentives is more nuanced than typically is recognized in the studies and 
an assessment of the efficacy of film incentives appears unresolved.  
State incentive programs are diverse and difficult to measure and interact with differences 
in state characteristics in ways that make studies of all states less likely to find the effects of state 
film incentive programs. The heterogeneity of case study results and lack of results in panel 
studies of all states suggest that the size and composition of the film and television industry and 
size of the incentive program in the state might matter.  
There is no perfect metric to evaluate film incentives. Data on film locations most 
directly track whether activity in the sector is affected by incentives. But film location data do 
not provide any information on whether the desired effects on state labor markets occur. A 
disconnect between production and state labor market outcomes can occur because of non-
resident employment in the industry and out-of-state spending. Among labor market indicators 
that can be used to assess film incentives, many are too aggregated across sectors and the overall 
economy; many metrics include activities not targeted by the incentives, making it difficult to 
detect incentive impacts. Narrowly defined indicators, both in concept and by industry, likely 
miss labor market outcomes that could be associated with film incentives. Most studies use 
payroll-based measures for the Motion Picture and Video Production industry. This leaves out 
proprietors, which would create larger induced spending effects from the industry.  
In contrast to economic impact studies of state film incentives, the academic studies do 
not integrate their findings with other relevant information on spillovers to the rest of the 
economy. At best, there is some use of existing nonacademic studies to perform back-of-the-
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envelope calculations. This likely occurs in part because of the cost of obtaining and using input-
output models to estimate spending effects on other sectors. Trying to detect the sector spillovers 
on the broader state economy statistically is difficult because of trends and shocks in other 
industries.  
There is little comparison to other state incentive programs. State incentive programs are 
ubiquitous and there should be more comparisons of the findings for film incentives to other 
programs. There is an opportunity cost to every incentive program and many or most programs 
likely do not pay for themselves. How footloose film industry establishments are compared to 
establishments in other industries would be a key consideration in benefit-cost comparisons of 
incentives to other industries (Bartik, 2019b).  
There is little or no discussion of film incentives in the studies to public policy making 
and social welfare more generally. Every action by state and local governments has an 
opportunity cost. Each dollar expended by government is one less spent in the private sector. 
There is little evidence that state and local tax reductions pay for themselves (Rickman and 
Wang, 2018) and in fact may only produce offsetting revenue through increased economic 
activity (Berck, Golan and Smith, 1997) approximately equal to the amounts often reported for 
film incentives (Weiner, 2009; Christopherson and Rightor, 2010; Tannenwald, 2010). 
Governments spend dollars on education and highways in part because of beliefs such 
expenditures may generate returns through increased economic activity (Bartik, 2019b), though 
society simply may intrinsically value education, increased safety on the roads, public libraries, 
public parks, etc. Sports activities and stadiums commonly receive strong public support for tax 
assistance despite widespread reports of a lack of impact on local economic development (Coates 
and Humphrey, 2008). There is evidence to suggest that states have adopted film incentives for 
intangible benefits such as quality of life and publicity (Sewordor and Sjoquist, 2016), which 
should be weighed against other policy objectives rather than simply assessed on narrow 
economic development metrics. 
3. Empirical Analysis 
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We attempt to fill in some of the current holes in the academic literature on the economics of 
state film incentives identified above. Following most of the empirical academic studies and 
economic impact studies (Weiner, 2009; Christopherson and Rightor, 2010; Tannenwald, 2010), 
we examine the Motion Picture and Video Production sector (NAICS 51211). The industry 
metrics we use are the levels of employment and total annual wages reported by the Quarterly 
Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW). The advantage of the QCEW data are that they are 
derived from a census, or full count, of activity each quarter of the year rather than from a 
sample for limited periods. We use the unsuppressed County Business Patterns Data produced by 
the W.E. Upjohn Institute (Bartik et al., 2018) and regression analysis to fill in suppressions in 
the QCEW data during 1998-2016. For comparability across states, employment in the sector is 
divided by the 2011 level of population and corresponding total annual wages is divided by the 
2011 level of personal income as reported by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).  
To all for potential heterogeneity of state experiences with film incentives, we follow 
Button (2018) and Bradbury (2019) and use the synthetic control method (SCM) of Abadie, 
Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010). SCM has been used extensively in policy evaluation, 
including numerous studies of state and local fiscal policy (Rickman and Wang, 2020). In SCM, 
a counterfactual or unit of comparison is constructed for establishing what would have happened 
in the absence of a change in policy or occurrence of some event. In our application, the unit of 
analysis is the state that changes its film incentive policy and the counterfactual is a weighted 
average of other states that did not make a change in its film incentive policy. The weights are 
calculated based on matching both the time series movement in the metric of the film industry 
prior to the policy change and variables representing characteristics that may affect filming 
activity in the state. The differences in outcomes in the metric before and after the change in 
policy become the estimate of its effects.  
The use of the SCM approach to identify the direct effects of film incentives stands in 
contrast to approaches used in economic impact studies (Weiner, 2009; Christopherson and 
Rightor, 2010; Tannenwald, 2010). The three approaches most commonly found in economic 
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impact studies are: 1) assuming that all production activity receiving incentives is attributable to 
the incentives, and sometimes including production activity not receiving incentives because of 
perceived cluster benefits; 2) attributing the change in trend in the state’s film production activity 
to the adoption of incentives; or 3) using the change in the state’s trend in film production 
activity relative to the national trend. All three approaches are problematic, with the first two 
approaches the mostly likely to yield upwardly biased estimates of the impacts of film incentives 
on film production. The findings by Owens and Rennhoff (2020) of non-incentive state 
characteristics influencing the location of film production supports the need to compare states 
that had similar characteristics and trends in production activity before changes in film incentive 
policies. Simple comparisons to national trends in the third approach likely produce biased 
estimates because of the dominance of California and New York in national film production. 
3.1 The Case Studies 
Because the results of one case study may not readily generalize broadly to other states 
we consider several scenarios across multiple states. The number of potential case study 
comparisons is limited though because almost all states have had incentives for the film and 
television industry in place at some point in time since 1998 (National Conference of State 
Legislatures, 2018; Bradbury, 2020a). Our solution is to formulate two general scenarios for the 
SCM analysis using periods where there are sufficient numbers of incentive policy differences 
across states. First, following Bradbury (2019) and Button (2019) we attempt to assess the effect 
of early adoption of film incentives. We compare the early adopters to states that never adopted 
incentives or did not adopt them until later. Second, in extending the literature we assess the 
effects on states that had film incentives during a sufficient period of time and then eliminated 
them. We compare these states to those that had incentives during the same period but never 
eliminated them. We include an analysis of the effects of capping incentives in Louisiana after 
years of no caps. Table 4 lists and provides details for the incentive scenarios examined. 
3.1.1 Early Incentive Adopters 
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A few states stand out as early adopters of incentives that have continued to maintain 
them. Focusing on the early adopters of incentives provides comparisons to other states before 
they adopted them. We follow Button (2018) and examine Louisiana and New Mexico because 
of their early adoption in 2002 and increased role and perceived success in the film industry 
(Tannenwald, 2010). We also examine North Carolina and Rhode Island which adopted 
incentives in 2000 and continue to maintain them, though North Carolina later switched from a 
tax credit to a grant program (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2018).  
To allow for at least five years of post-adoption analysis we examine metrics through 
2006. We use data beginning in 1990 to provide a longer period for matching the pre-incentive 
film production experiences of the early adopters with those of non-adopters, which better 
matches on unobservable factors over time that may influence film production (Abadie, 
Diamond and Hainmueller, 2010). The number of states to include as potential donors to the 
counterfactual unit is limited because of the number of states that had adopted incentive 
programs by 2006 and QCEW data nondisclosures pre-1998. States included as potential donors 
that never adopted film incentives for which data are available include Idaho, New Hampshire, 
and South Dakota. Potential donor states that adopted incentives in 2007 or later include Indiana, 
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Nevada, Ohio, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 
3.1.2 Incentive Eliminators 
Re-evaluation of film incentive program impacts, state budget difficulties, and 
controversies led thirteen states to end their incentive programs between 2009 and 2018 (Verrier, 
2011; Skorup, 2017; National Conference of State Legislatures, 2018). Many of the states had 
maintained the incentive programs for several years. Elimination of the programs has not been 
without controversy and calls to re-instate them (e.g., Thompson, 2019; Cain, 2020; George, 
2020; Morehead, 2020). We examine the experiences of six states that ended their incentive 
programs as case studies: Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Michigan, Vermont, and Wisconsin.  
The six states had incentives in place for the following periods (Table 4) indicated in 
parentheses: Arizona (2006-2010), Florida (2003-2016), Indiana (2007-2011), Michigan (2008-
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2015), Vermont (2006-2011) and Wisconsin (2008-2013). We compare the states ending their 
incentive programs to states that had incentive programs over the same periods but maintained 
them through the end of the sample period. Twenty states that had incentives in place from 2006 
until 2019 comprise the donor pool: Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Washington. 
The pre-treatment period for each state begins with the latter of 2006 or the year of incentive 
adoption. Years after termination of the incentive program until 2019 comprise the post-
treatment period for each state. 
3.2 SCM Implementation 
The SCM method selects states from a donor pool and assigns them weights to match 
pre-treatment fits of both the outcome variable and the characteristics of the states. The closer the 
incentive state examined is to its counterfactual comparison in the outcome variable and 
characteristics the more likely the counterfactual represents what would have happened in the 
incentive state without adoption or repeal of incentives. The state characteristics used in the 
SCM matching are measures of housing costs, the average wage rate, the tax and regulatory 
climate, natural amenity attractiveness, the share of the adult population a bachelor’s degree, 
population density, and a measure of industry composition. These are characteristics that have 
been shown to affect both overall economic growth in a state (Rickman and Wang, 2020) and 
location of filming activity (Owens and Rennhoff, 2020). As shown in Table 5, alternative 
measures are used for some characteristics to fit the years used for the pre-treatment period of the 
scenario. All measures pre-date the year of change in incentive program. 
3.3 Results and Analysis 
Table 6 contains a summary of the SCM results for all scenarios. Reported for each 
scenario is the difference between each pair of paths in the years after (before) the adoption 
(elimination) of the incentive program relative to the difference before (after) incentive adoption 
(elimination); i.e., an estimated difference-in-differences (DID). The DID is interpreted as the 
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effect of the state incentive program. Each DID is translated into the impact on the economic 
measure examined and reported in the third column of the table. 
3.3.1 Film Incentive Adoption Scenarios 
Figures 1-4 shown the SCM results for the four early adopting states examined. Below 
each figure are the weights for the states that comprise each synthetic control and the estimated 
DID (translated into the impacts on employment and wages in Table 6). Although not shown, we 
discuss how close the characteristics of the synthetic control units are to those of the 
corresponding incentive-adopting state. 
Figure 1 shows dramatic increases in both employment and wages for Motion Picture and 
Video Production in Louisiana after adoption of incentives in 2002. Prior to adoption of  
the incentives, Louisiana employment and wages in the sector followed those of the synthetic 
controls fairly closely. The characteristics of the two synthetic control units closely match those 
of Louisiana. 
The DID estimates for 2002-2006 vs. 1990-2002 equal 0.309 for employment and 0.291 
for wages. Converting the difference in estimated DID per capita jobs relative to the actual per 
capita jobs to total jobs, the DID estimate implies that the increase in the number of employees 
from 516 in 2002 to 1,875 in 2006 in the sector would have instead been a drop of 56 without the 
adoption of incentives. The increase represents a two hundred seventy-four percent increase of 
the 2002 value, which compares to a 1.7 percent increase nationally. The DID estimate for wages 
implies that the approximately four hundred percent increase that occurred over the 2002-2006 
period underestimates (by 27.3 percent) the effect of the incentives and dominates the 
corresponding sixteen percent that occurred across the nation. 
Figure 2 likewise shows strong increases in Motion Picture and Video Production sector 
employment and wages for New Mexico after its adoption of a film incentive program in 2002. 
The paths of New Mexico employment and wages follow those of the corresponding synthetic 
paths from 1990 through at least the last year of not having the incentive program. The synthetic 
path for employment drops more than New Mexico’s during the initial couple of years of 
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adoption and holds steady for wages. Dramatic divergence of the two sets of paths occur during 
2005-2006. The synthetic control characteristics most closely match New Mexico’s in terms of 
lower housing rents, lower average wage rate and lower shares of adults with a bachelor’s 
degree. 
The difference-in-differences (DID) estimates for 2002-2006 vs. 1990-2002 equal 0.632 
for employment and 0.66 for wages. The employment DID implies that New Mexico’s 
incentives caused the number of jobs in its Motion Picture and Video Production sector to 
increase two hundred and eighty-six percent of its 2002 value. The estimated DID for wages 
approximately equals the actual change in wages, which implies that the increase in wages from 
$12,450 thousand in 2002 to $60,370 thousand in 2006 occurred because of the adoption of 
incentives.  
Figure 3 shows small effects of tax incentives for North Carolina from 2000 to 2006. The 
pre-treatment period begins in 1993 because of a lack of fit for pre-treatment paths using 1990 as 
the first pre-treatment year. The synthetic unit characteristics generally are similar to those for 
North Carolina. Notable exceptions are the relatively faster industry mix employment growth 
and somewhat lower wage rates in both synthetic control units. 
The estimated DID for North Carolina is 0.009 for employment and 0.032 for wages. The 
employment DID implies that instead of losing 481 jobs in the sector over the period, the state 
would have lost 567 jobs without the incentives, a positive impact of 86 jobs (equal to 7.7 
percent relative to the 2000 value). The DID for wages implies a gain from the incentives 
approximately equal to fifty-one percent of the 2000 level.  
Although Rhode Island adopted incentives in 2000 it is not until 2006, the last year in the 
sample, that there is a detectable impact of the incentives on employment and wages (Figure 4). 
Rhode Island’s pre-treatment paths of employment and wages closely match the corresponding 
synthetic unit paths. Although outside the sample because of considerations of having a larger 
donor pool, employment and wages remain elevated post-2006, suggesting longer term effects of 
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the incentives. Rhode Island had higher housing rents, wage rates and population density than 
both synthetic control units. 
The DID estimate for employment equals 0.257 and for wages equals 0.493. Rhode 
Island’s estimated employment DID slightly exceeds the actual per capita change in employment 
from 2000 to 2006. The incentives caused employment to increase by three hundred and fifty-
two percent of the 2000 value of seventy-seven. Approximately the entirety of the post-incentive 
wage increase can be attributed to Rhode Island’s adoption of incentives. 
3.3.2 Film Incentive Elimination Scenarios 
Figures 5-8 display the synthetic control method (SCM) results for states that eliminated 
their film incentives. Each figure contains the path of employment or wages in the Motion 
Picture and Video Production sector (NAICS 51211) before and after the repeal of incentives and 
compares it to the path of the corresponding synthetic control comprised of states that had 
incentives throughout the period of analysis. The difference between each pair of paths in the 
years after the repeal of the incentive program relative to the difference before incentive 
elimination is interpreted as the effect of the state incentive program. 
 Figure 5 contains the SCM results for Indiana, which had incentives in place between 
2007 and 2011. After matching the synthetic control paths during the period when incentives 
were in place, both employment and wages in the Motion Picture and Video Production sector 
fell below the synthetic control paths after the repeal of incentives. Indiana is slightly less 
amenity attractive and slightly more densely populated than each of its synthetic control units. 
 From Table 6, the estimated DID for Indiana is -0.055 for employment and -0.024 for 
wages. The estimated DID for employment implies that rather than declining by twenty-four 
from 2011-2019, employment in Indiana’s Motion Picture and Video Production sector would 
have increased by three hundred thirty-four, an eighty-three percent change relative to the 
employment level of four hundred thirty-three in 2011. The estimated DID for wages implies 
about thirty percent lower total annual wages in the sector because of the absence of incentives. 
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 The Wisconsin incentive repeal exhibits a similar pattern in Figure 6 to Indiana’s. Wages 
in the sector especially would have increased more with incentives. The characteristics of the 
synthetic control units mostly match those of Wisconsin, with the exceptions that Wisconsin is 
less densely populated and had a greater composition of slower growing industries nationally 
during 1998-2002. 
The estimated DID for Wisconsin is -0.028 for employment and -0.106 for wages in the 
industry. Rather than only increasing by thirty-six during 2013-2019, the SCM suggests that 
Wisconsin’s employment in the sector would have increased by one hundred ninety-four, the 
difference representing 26.5 percent growth of the 2013 level of five hundred ninety-six. For the 
sector’s total annual wages in Wisconsin, the estimated DID suggests they would have been 
higher by one hundred and three percent of the 2013 value. 
Figure 7 suggests the repeal of film incentives in Florida reduced both employment and 
wages in its Motion Picture and Video Production sector. Florida had incentives in place from 
2003 to 2016, yielding a long pre-incentive repeal period for matching. Florida’s characteristics 
generally matched those of the synthetic control units with a couple of exceptions. For both the 
employment and wage comparisons, Florida is somewhat more amenity attractive and more 
densely populated than the synthetic control units.  
Although the differences appear small in Figure 7 compared to the previous figures, this 
in part is because of the long pre-treatment period and wider range of values. The estimated DID 
is -0.038 for employment and -0.073 for wage. The estimated employment DID indicates that 
employment would have increased by seven hundred twenty-four from 2016 to 2019 rather than 
increasing only by seven. Relative to the level of employment of 6,092 in 2016, this translates 
into a 11.8 percent lower level than what would have occurred with incentives. Wages would 
have been 13.1 percent higher relative to the 2016 value had Florida maintained the incentives.  
 Figure 8 shows Michigan’s experience with repealing its film incentives in 2015. With 
the exception of an upward blip in wages in 2011, Michigan’s paths of employment and total 
annual wages follow those of the synthetic control paths. Michigan is somewhat less natural 
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amenity attractive and had somewhat lower bachelor’s degree shares in 2000 than its synthetic 
control units, but otherwise matches the synthetic control units well. 
The estimated DID for employment is -0.132 and total annual wages is -0.125. The 
estimated DID for employment suggests that it would have increased by nine hundred forty-nine 
from 2015 to 2019 rather decrease by three hundred fifty-three, with the difference representing 
70.3 percent of employment in the sector in 2015.  The estimated DID suggests total annual 
wages in the Motion Picture and Video Production sector would have been 44.8 percent higher in 
terms of the 2015 value had Michigan retained its incentives. 
  We also examine the repealing of incentives for Arizona and Vermont. For both Arizona 
and Vermont, the employment paths during the pre-incentive years did not match well and 
violated the parallel trends assumption needed for unbiased estimation of the effect of repealing 
incentives. The paths for total annual wages matched well for both states. Arizona’s synthetic 
control for total wages is comprised of three states (SC=0.743, TX=0.151, ME=0.106). 
Compared to the synthetic control unit, Arizona is more natural amenity attractive, had higher 
wages, had higher housing costs, and had a mix of faster growing industries nationally during 
2002-2007. Vermont’s synthetic control unit for total annual wages is comprised of four states 
(MT=0.352, MS=0.326, MN=0.293, RI=0.029) and closely matches Vermont’s characteristics.  
The estimated DID for total annual wages equals -0.098 for Arizona and -0.11 for 
Vermont. Arizona’s DID estimate suggests that maintaining incentives would have led to an 
increase in total wages equal to one hundred forty-one percent of the 2010 value. Vermont’s DID 
for total annual wages suggests an incentive-induced increase of total wages equal to 85.6 
percent of the 2011 value.   
One final scenario considered was the capping of the total amount of incentives in 
Louisiana. Previously uncapped, Louisiana capped the amount of tax credits that could be 
claimed at $180 million in 2015 in response to budgetary concerns, reducing the cap further to 
$150 million in 2017 (Karlin, 2019), which are lower than the 240 million dollar revenue loss 
associated with incentives in 2014 (The Public Affairs Research Council of Louisiana, 2015). 
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The response of film production to the capping of incentives in Louisiana provides another test 
of the role of film incentives in state film production. We specify 2006-2015 as the period to 
construct the synthetic control match and compare the difference in changes from 2015-2019.  
Employment in the Motion Picture and Video Production sector fell post-2015 in 
Louisiana but the SCM fails to produce a suitable employment counterfactual. SCM succeeds in 
matching the path of Louisiana’s total annual wages in the sector. Louisiana’s synthetic control 
comparison for total annual wages is comprised of the following states, with the weights in 
parentheses: Connecticut (0.536), New Mexico (0.294), and Tennessee (0.17). In contrast to 
Louisiana’s total wages, total wages of the synthetic control unit rose from 2015 to 2019. There 
were no major changes in the incentive programs of the states comprising the synthetic control 
during 2015-2019. The estimated DID for the total annual wage scenario is -0.683. The SCM 
DID estimate suggests that total annual wages in the sector would have been nearly fifty percent 
higher in 2019 (forty-three percent of the 2015 value) had Louisiana not capped its incentives. 
3.3.3 Placebo Tests 
We follow convention in SCM studies and recommended best-practices in empirical 
research and perform placebo tests. We specify each state in the donor pool as making a change 
in film incentive policy and use the remaining states in constructing a counterfactual comparison. 
The difference in outcomes for the placebo states versus their counterfactual comparisons should 
be nonexistent or at least smaller than the differences for states that made changes in their 
incentive programs as a state not changing its incentive program would not be expected to have a 
change in outcome. We use the rank of the difference in outcomes (DID) for the state making a 
change in its incentive policy relative to the differences for the placebo states divided by the 
number of donor pool states as the level of significance (Munasib and Rickman, 2015; Rickman 
and Wang, 2018, 2020). 
Figures 9 and 10 show the placebo test results for the state film adoption scenario. Each 
line represents the difference between the actual outcome and the predicted outcome based on 
the synthetic control unit. The donor states are shown by thin solid lines, while the four incentive 
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adopting states examined are shown by dashed colored lines. The synthetic controls for the donor 
states are constructed using 1990-2000 as the pre-treatment period.  
 For the donor states, and North Carolina and Rhode Island, the DID calculations use 
1990-2000 and 2000-2006, prorated per year. For Louisiana and New Mexico, the calculations 
use 1990-2002 and 2002-2006, which when compared to 2000 for the donor states makes it more 
challenging to demonstrate a statistically significant effect for the two states. Based on the DID 
calculations, for both employment and wages, Louisiana, New Mexico, and Rhode Island rank 
first compared to the donor states (not shown), making their results statistically significant below 
the 0.1 level (i.e., 1/13=0.08). North Carolina’s DID ranks eighth for employment and fourth 
largest for wages and salaries, which makes North Carolina’s estimated positive effects for 
employment and wages in the Motion Picture and Video Production sector statistically 
insignificant. 
We repeat the placebo analysis for the states that repealed their incentive programs, or in 
the case of Louisiana capped its incentives. First, we perform a placebo analysis for Arizona, 
Indiana, Wisconsin, and Vermont, which did not have incentives for long-periods of time. For 
the twenty donors we specify 2006-2011 as the pre-treatment (incentive) period and 2012-2019 
as the post-treatment period without incentives. Second, we perform a placebo analysis for 
Florida, Louisiana, and Michigan. The pre-treatment period is 2006-2015, leaving 2016-2019 as 
the post-treatment period. 
 For the first placebo analysis, none of the state declines in employment or wages are 
statistically significant (not shown). The estimated DID for employment ranks ninth for both 
Indiana and Wisconsin compared to the DID for the placebo states. Recall that the SCM failed to 
produce a successful employment synthetic control for Arizona and Vermont. For wages, the 
estimated DID ranks sixth for both Wisconsin and Vermont, seventh for Arizona, and twelfth for 
Indiana. The DID calculations for the incentive repealing states are based on the year of repeal in 
each of the states and prorated per year.  
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 Figures 11 and 12 show the placebo test results for Florida, Louisiana, and Michigan. 
Recall that the SCM failed to produce an efficacious employment counterfactual for Louisiana. 
So, Louisiana is not included in Figure 11. Of the twenty donor states, the SCM only produced 
seventeen successful placebo comparisons for both the employment and wage scenarios. 
 In the employment placebo comparison, the estimated DID for Michigan ranks second 
and Florida’s ranks eighth most negative. With only seventeen placebo comparisons, neither 
estimated DID qualifies as statistically significant, though Michigan comes close. In the wage 
placebo scenario, Louisiana ranks first, Michigan ranks second, and Florida ranks fifth, for most  
negative DID. This qualifies the negative post-incentive repeal of Louisiana as statistically 
significant, with that of Michigan again nearly significant.4  
3.4 Re-evaluation of the Cost-Effectiveness of Incentives for Louisiana and New Mexico 
Using the above SCM estimates for the adoption of incentives in Louisiana and New 
Mexico, we estimate the state budgetary return from economic activity stimulated by film 
incentives and the dollar incentive cost per job created. We compare and contrast them to those 
of Button (2018), Owens and Rennhoff (2020), and related economic impact studies.  
 Although our pre-treatment (incentive) period ends in 2006, and two of the states 
contributing to the synthetic control for employment subsequently adopted incentives, Wyoming 
in 2007 and West Virginia in 2008, we calculate the synthetic control estimates through 2008 for 
comparability with Button (2018). If anything, this would bias our estimated incentive impacts 
for Louisiana downwards if Wyoming’s and West Virginia’s incentives stimulated their film 
production post-2006. 
From the SCM incentive adoption scenario the average difference in Louisiana’s level of 
Motion Picture and Video Production (NAICS 51211) employment from its synthetic control for 
2003-2008 is 1,417. This includes an adjustment for the average difference during the pre-
 
4 Georgia is the placebo state with the strongest positive increase in both employment and wages and salaries after 
2014-2015, likely attributable to the opening of Pinewood Atlanta Studios in 2013 and the production of several 
Marvel films. Georgia only contributed to the synthetic controls of Florida with weights of 0.032 for employment 
and 0.028 for wages. So, the positive relative outcome in Georgia did not much influence the SCM DID for the 
incentive elimination scenarios for Florida, Louisiana, or Michigan. 
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incentive period between Louisiana and its synthetic control. Our estimate exceeds the value of 
1,111 reported by Button (2018) for the period. Using a Type II employment multiplier of 2.78 
from the IO-Snap input-output model software for Louisiana (IO-Snap, 2019), the total 
employment impact of the incentives is predicted to be 3,943. The Type II multiplier includes 
both the estimated indirect effects on other sectors from increased film production spending and 
estimated induced effects on consumption from increased income. 
Louisiana employment in the related sub-sectors of Motion Pictures and Video 
Distribution (NAICS 51212) and Postproduction Services and Other Motion Picture and Video 
Industries (NAICS 51219) declined from 2002-2006. Consistent with the empirical evidence by 
Button (2019) for all states, there does not appear to be an incentive effect on Independent 
Artists, Writers and Performers sector (NAICS 7115) as it also declined during 2002-2006 in 
Louisiana. It appears then that Motion Picture and Video Production (NAICS 51211) is the 
incentivized sector in Louisiana. 
The corresponding SCM estimated impact on total annual wages in Motion Picture and 
Video Production is $55,708,751 for 2003-2008. There is less potential bias in the estimated 
wage treatment effect for 2007-2008 because the two weights for West Virginia and Wyoming 
only sum to 0.026 for the wage synthetic control. Consistent with employment, there appears to 
be no effect on total annual wages in NAICS 51212, 51219, or 7115. Multiplying the SCM direct 
wage effect by the IO-Snap income multiplier of 2.643 yields a predicted total wage impact of 
$147,238,229. Using tax data from the Annual Survey of Government Finances (Urban Land 
Institute, 2020) and BEA wage and salary data, an average ratio of total state taxes (less net 
corporate income taxes and the category including severance taxes) to wage and salary income 
over 2003-2008 is calculated as 0.112. Multiplying the total estimated wage impact by this ratio 
produces an estimated revenue feedback from film-induced economic activity of $16,542,630.   
Button (2018) reports an average of $75.3 million in film incentives over the period in 
2009 dollars. Converting this into an average of $70.6 million nominal dollars for 2003-2008, the 
return to state revenue would be 0.23. Subtracting the revenue feedback from the nominal 
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incentive cost and dividing by the estimated total number of jobs created, produces an estimate 
of $13,698 cost per job created from the film incentives. In contrast, Button (2018) estimates an 
incentive cost per job of $48,388 based on the SCM estimated job impact in the paper. While 
complete details of Button’s calculation are not provided in the paper, the estimate appears to 
only include the direct jobs stimulated but includes the addition of estimated contract jobs in 
addition to establishment jobs.  
The average ratio over the period of BEA total employment, which includes proprietors, 
and BEA wage and salary employment for the aggregate sector Motion Picture and Sound 
Recording sector  (NAICS 512) is 1.16, suggesting our net revenue cost per job could be sixteen 
percent lower if the aggregate ratio held for Motion Picture and Video Production (NAICS 
51211) (i.e., $13,698/1.16=$11,807). There is a slight negative but statistically insignificant 
relationship between the ratio across states in 2017 and the Census County Business Pattern 
share of employment in NAICS 51211 in the aggregate sector, suggesting that adjusting by the 
NAICS 512 total employment to wage and salary employment ratio may be appropriate for 
estimating the proprietor impact in NAICS 51211.  
Following Button (2018), we perform a similar exercise for New Mexico. The SCM 
estimate of the average level of employment in NAICS 51211in New Mexico relative to its 
synthetic control unit, adjusted for the pre-incentive difference, is 1,048, exceeding Button’s 
estimate of 830. If anything, the estimate could be biased downwards because of the larger 
weight that West Virginia has in the employment synthetic control. Given the IO-Snap 
employment multiplier of 3.62, New Mexico’s incentives are predicted to have increased total 
employment in the economy by 3,442. QCEW employment and wage data are not disclosed for 
most years by BLS for NAICS 51212 and 51219 in New Mexico to preserve confidentiality, and 
where they are disclosed the values are small. Employment and total annual wages in NAICS 
7115 either are flat or decrease over the period. 
The corresponding SCM estimate of total annual wages for New Mexico is $37,115,698 
which translates into $94,756,378 with an approximate income multiplier of 2.55. Potential 
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downward bias in the estimate may exist because of the larger weight that Michigan receives in 
the construction of the synthetic control, which adopted incentives in 2008. The average tax ratio 
to wages and salaries for New Mexico (as calculated above for Louisiana) over the period is 
0.123, which when applied to the total estimated change in total annual wages produces an 
estimated return to state tax revenue of $12,369,570. The rate of return on film incentive dollars 
to the state budget then equals 0.48. The net revenue cost per job created from the film incentives 
equals $3,593, which as with Louisiana is much lower than the estimate by Button (2018), 
reported as $21,035. Our estimated cost could be yet sixteen percent lower because of the ratio of 
total employment to wage and salary employment over the 2003-2008 period (i.e., 
$3,593/1.16=$3,097). 
Besides differences in SCM estimates and our use of input-output multipliers to capture 
indirect effects, differences in our estimates of the cost-effectiveness of the incentives from 
Button (2018) may arise from the tax rates used in the calculations. We assume that increased 
wages affect most categories of taxes and not just the major categories such as income taxes and 
sales taxes, which produces larger estimated revenue feedbacks. The sole categories removed 
from consideration are net corporate income taxes and taxes NEC (which includes severance 
taxes), both of which are sensitive to the energy industry in each state.5  
Our estimates of the cost per job of $13,698 and return on investment equal to 0.23 are 
closer to those of other studies of Louisiana for different time periods. For 2013, Owens and 
Rennhoff (2020), which includes multiplier effects, report a state return-on-investment of $0.17 
and dollar incentive cost per job of $20,224 for Louisiana. In economic impact studies, Loren C. 
Scott & Associates estimate an incentive dollar cost per job of $15,494 for 2015-2016, while for 
2017-2018 Camoin Associates (2020) report a return-on-investment of $0.35 and dollar incentive 
cost per job of $12,895. The above rate of return estimate for New Mexico of $0.48 and 
 
5
 The tax revenue feedbacks are close to those predicted from regressions of the tax measures on total wages and 
salaries in natural logarithms for the two states from 1990-2008; Louisiana’s regression estimates suggest slightly 
higher feedback on revenue, while New Mexico’s regression estimates suggest slightly lower revenue feedback. 
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associated estimated net cost per job of $3,593 are more favorable than those reported for New 
Mexico by Owens and Rennhoff (2020) of  $0.20 and $17,807, and the economic impact study 
by Popp and Peach (2008) of $0.14 and $13,424.99. More comparable estimates of $0.33 and 
$8,519 are provided by MNP LLP (2014) in an economic impact study.  
3.5 Discussion of Key Findings 
1) State film incentives likely increase economic activity in the intended sector.  
a. For three of the four early adopters examined, both employment and wages in the Motion 
Picture and Video Production sector significantly increased in the state after adoption of 
an incentive program relative to a matched comparison unit that predicts what would 
have happened without the incentives. For the fourth early adopting state, estimated 
relative wages increase after adoption of incentives, but the estimate is not statistically 
significant. 
b. Evidence from examining six states that repealed their incentives suggests meaningful 
declines in Motion Picture and Video Production employment and wages after the 
elimination of incentives, though they lacked statistical significance. The capping of 
incentives in Louisiana is shown to have significantly reduced wages in the film sector, 
though an effective comparison unit for employment is not available. 
c. Incentives can play a much larger role in Motion Picture and Video Production than do 
state incentives in other sectors. Based on a review of 34 empirical incentive studies, 
Bartik (2018) concludes that incentives generally play a minor role in other sectors. 
Depending on the relative credence given to each of the studies reviewed, Bartik suggests 
that between 75 percent to 98 percent of firm location decisions would have been the 
same without the incentives received. Based on the analysis above, comparable 
calculations for the percent of Motion Picture and Video Production employment that 
would have occurred without film incentives in the four early incentive adopters in 2006 




2) Successful state film incentives programs likely generate significant budgetary returns from 
increased spending in Motion Pictures and Video Production and its indirect effects on spending 
in the rest of the economy. The incentives programs are highly unlikely to pay for themselves 
though unless the increase in state filming increases tourism or increases quality of life and 
attracts new residents, considerations not examined in the study. Our estimated net revenue costs 
per job associated with state film incentives for Louisiana and New Mexico compare favorably 
to those of other export-based sectors. Bartik (2019a) reports an average cost of $24 thousand of 
state job and investment tax credits per direct job created across the US in 2015. Assuming an 
average state employment multiplier of two across the nation reduces the incentive cost to $12 
thousand per job. But assuming an upper bound of 25 percent of the jobs as incentivized from the 
above discussion increases the cost to $48 thousand, which greatly exceeds our state film 
incentive estimates of $13,698 for Louisiana and $3,593 for New Mexico.  
3) Successful state film incentive programs likely pass a benefit-cost analysis. Using a baseline 
model of general incentive benefits and costs, Bartik (2019b, p. 40) reports a benefit-cost ratio of 
1.52. Included in the baseline model is an assumption that incentives induce the location or 
expansion decision of 12 percent of the firms. The findings above for four early film incentive 
adopting states that incentives induced 13.6 to 82.6 percent of film spending suggest benefit-cost 
ratios that are multiples of the baseline model benefit-cost ratio of Bartik (2019b) for the more 
successful programs.  
4.   Conclusions 
This paper advances empirical knowledge and policy discussion of the economics of state film 
incentives through critically reviewing existing academic empirical studies, conducting 
additional empirical analysis, and placing the issue within the broader context of state financial 
incentives and social welfare analysis. Previous empirical studies report mixed support for the 
ability of state film incentives to induce the intended activity. Studies more likely find the 
intended incentive effects on the number of film and television productions than on related labor 
market outcomes. Case studies more likely find positive effects of incentives than panel studies 
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of all states, though the effects mostly are modest or statistically insignificant. At best, the 
studies reviewed are inconclusive on the efficacy of state film incentives as an economic 
development tool. 
We further pursue the case study approach using the synthetic control method (SCM). In 
an extension of previous SCM studies and a contribution to the empirical literature, we not only 
examine the scenarios of early film incentive adoption we also examine several scenarios where 
states eliminated film incentives that had been in place for at least several years. We examine 
both employment and wages and use additional information in constructing the synthetic 
counterfactual comparisons. Overall, we find it more likely than not that state film incentives 
increase employment and wages in the state film and television sector. Where the results are 
statistically significant, we find support for the assumption used in some economic impact 
studies that all changes in state film and television production after a change in incentives occur 
because of the change. But the commonly used assumption in economic impact studies that all 
state film and television spending receiving incentives occurs because of them is suggested to 
significantly overstate the effects of the incentives. 
We similarly find support for the values of the return on incentive investment (ROI) and 
incentive cost per job reported in the more thorough and transparent economic impact studies 
such as for Louisiana and New Mexico. Much like the conclusions of studies regarding 
reductions in state and local taxes (Rickman and Wang, 2020), the incentives do not pay for 
themselves. But because of the higher average pay in most incentivized state and local film 
activity, and the greater estimated footloose nature of the industry, state film incentives can 
produce a higher ROI, a lower incentive cost per job, and a larger benefit-cost ratio, than the 
typical state incentive. 
The literature review and added empirical analysis suggest, however, that not all 
incentive programs likely are successful. Those that are small, having low caps on spending, or 
requiring legislative approval each year, may lack sufficient size and certainty to attract state 
film and television productions. The reductions in employment and wages in the Motion Picture 
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and Video Production sector following the elimination or capping of incentives though suggest 
that any cluster effect that exists with size is not sufficiently strong to offset the continual need 
for some amount of film incentives once the industry is established in the state to maintain the 
size attained.  
The policy context of the state matters in evaluating the social welfare implications of 
state film incentives. Are other state government services adequately funded? If education or 
physical infrastructure are insufficiently funded, reducing funding for them further to provide 
incentives may not pass a benefit-cost analysis. Citizens might value the presence of state film 
and television production to pay for net costs of the incentives such as often occurs for sports 
teams (Coates and Humphreys, 2008). Each case should be assessed on its own merits, taking 
into account program characteristics, state economic conditions, and citizen preferences. No 
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Table 1. State Film and Television Industry Labor Market Statistics: Year 2019 
State Establishments Employment Employment as  
%  of US 
Annual Wage 
Rate ($) 
California 10,247 120,752 45.9 134,929 
New York 3,062 49,692 18.9 107,377 
Georgia 612 16,433 6.2 69,519 
Florida 1,151 6,875 2.6 76,390 
Texas 859 6,290 2.4 61,926 
Tennessee 304 5,739 2.2 54,834 
Illinois 691 4,458 1.7 84,739 
Louisiana 204 4,450 1.7 59,298 
New Jersey 293 4,081 1.6 100,522 
Pennsylvania 371 3,928 1.5 68,287 
Connecticut 258 3,627 1.4 140,040 
Massachusetts 353 3,383 1.3 69,009 
Oregon 330 2,944 1.1 55,309 
New Mexico 145 2,205 0.8 80,179 
Utah 337 2,165 0.8 52,208 
Washington 301 2,048 0.8 53,466 
Virginia 260 1,884 0.7 72,164 
North Carolina 437 1,779 0.7 57,659 
Ohio 307 1,779 0.7 54,249 
Colorado 386 1,648 0.6 58,437 
Michigan 336 1,622 0.6 64,167 
Hawaii 129 1,560 0.6 61,987 
Nevada 214 1,549 0.6 41,230 
Arizona 255 1,514 0.6 32,049 
Maryland 277 1,436 0.5 64,320 
Missouri 181 1,091 0.4 48,661 
South Carolina 138 971 0.4 53,250 
Minnesota 211 933 0.4 53,887 
Alabama 133 721 0.3 57,901 
Wisconsin 180 672 0.3 47,341 
Indiana 164 478 0.2 55,228 
Kentucky 146 468 0.2 47,677 
Rhode Island 79 388 0.1 77,264 
New Hampshire 51 350 0.1 65,036 
Oklahoma 107 317 0.1 47,722 
Montana 77 290 0.1 59,624 
Iowa 82 249 0.1 50,652 
West Virginia 34 232 0.1 27,615 
Arkansas 88 224 0.1 69,774 
Mississippi 67 218 0.1 27,428 
Maine 89 169 0.1 46,846 
Kansas 77 167 0.1 41,930 
South Dakota 56 143 0.1 36,301 
Vermont 38 127 0.0 40,663 
Nebraska 55 110 0.0 40,326 
Idaho 44 105 0.0 42,025 
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Delaware 36 63 0.0 11,371 
North Dakota 25 42 0.0 81,834 
Alaska 25 40 0.0 34,498 
Wyoming 23 36 0.0 134,418 
United States 24,460 263,064 100.0 106,328 
Note: Industry statistics are from the QCEW database. The industry is defined as NAICS 512110 + 512120 + 
512191 + 512199.  






Table 2. Study Focus  
Study Region  Years Outcomes Examined Incentive Variables 
Adkisson 
(2013) 
44 states with incentives 1997-
2011 
Motion Picture and Video Industries QCEW 
Employment (NAICS 51211-51219)  




Lower 48 states 1998-
2011 
Motion Picture and Video Industries CBP 
Employment and Establishment Shares (NAICS 
512110-512199); D&B non-wage contractors 




Louisiana, New Mexico 1998-
2008 
IMDb productions; Feature Films; Television 
Series; Motion Picture and Video Production 
QCEW Employment and Establishments 
(NAICS 512110, SIC 7812) 









IMDb Feature Films; Motion Picture and Video 
Industries CBP Employment and Establishments 
(NAICS 5121) 
Year has any incentive and 




Lower 48 states 1998-
2013 
Motion Picture and Sound Recording Studios 
BEA Gross State Product, Employment, Wages 
(NAICS 512) 
Year of adoption or elimination 
for each of four incentives; 
Annual SFI spending 
Bradbury 
(2019) 
Georgia and North 
Carolina 
1990-
2016   
Per Capita Income Year of adoption for Georgia; 
Years of adoption and 
increased generosity of 
incentives for North Carolina 
Button 
(2019) 




Feature Films; Television Series; QCEW and 
CBP Motion Picture and Video Production 
Employment and Establishments (NAICS 
512110, SIC 7812) and related industries  
Year of adoption for any 
incentive 






QCEW Motion Picture and Video Production 




Lower 48 states 2000-
2015 
BEA Gross State Product and Personal Income 
Per Capita; Motion Picture and Sound 
Recording Studios Gross State Product (Share 
and Per Capita) 








Number of Movie and Television Productions; 
Employment, Establishments, and Annual Wage 
in Sector 








IMDb Feature Films (majors, mini-majors, 
independents) 
Year has any incentive and by 
type; value of incentive by type 
BEA-US Bureau of Economic Analysis; CBP-US Census County Business Patterns; D&B-Dun and Bradstreet; DID-Difference-in-Differences 
FE-Fixed Effects; NAICS-North American Industrial Classification System; QCEW-US Bureau of Labor Statistics Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages; 




Table 3. Study Methodology and Findings 
Study Method Empirical Findings Policy Conclusions 
Adkisson 
(2013) 
Case study trend 
analysis 
A few states slightly gained employment, 
others lost employment; Occurred across early 
and late incentive adopters and early followers 
Incentives are a zero-sum game for national 




Differences; State and 
year fixed effects 
None of the incentive variables are 
statistically significant for employment or 
establishments; No net effect on D&B non-
wage contractor moves 





Method case study 
Significant effect on IMDb productions and 
feature films but not television series; Positive 
but insignificant effects on employment or 
establishments 
Best case cost per job, including contractors, 







Domestic Product as a 
Control Variable  
Existence of any incentives increases number 
of films produced in the state; Mixed evidence 
for incentive effects on employment and 
establishments; Diversity and dominance of 
companies increases filming activity, 
employment, and number of establishments   
Design incentives to increase 
organizational diversity, especially for 
companies involved in distribution, 




Differences; State and 
year fixed effects; 
Control variables 
Refundable credits significantly increased 
wages in the industry; Duration of 
transferrable credits increased employment; 
Annual SFI spending insignificant; No gross 
state product effects 
More attention needed for incentive design; 
Need for better cost-benefit analysis and 




Method case study 
Negative but statistically insignificant effects 
on per capita income (despite raw increases in 
QCEW NAICS 512110 employment and 
establishments)  
No wider impacts on overall economy; 





Differences; State and 
year fixed effects; 
Control variables; 
Event study 
Large effect on TV series filming that occurs 
gradually over time and in states with a 
medium or large existing industry size and 
may persist after incentive repeal; Little 
evidence feature film production location is 
Agglomeration spillovers of TV series filming 




affected by incentives; No evidence for 
meaningful positive effects on labor market 
indicators in the sector or in related sectors 
Thom 
(2019) 
Case study; Interrupted 
Time Series Analysis; 
Control Variables 
Statistically significant immediate effect on 
Connecticut, which is attributable to the 
nontax component of incentives; Statistically 
significant effect over time on Louisiana 
Evidence of interstate competition; No 







Differences; State and 
year fixed effects; 
Control variables 
No link between incentives and overall 
economic activity 
No basis for economic development to justify 
film incentives.  
Meares et 
al. (2020) 
Case study trend 
analysis 
Increased number of NAICS 5122110, QCEW 
establishments, employment, wages; Increased 
number of IMDb productions and money 
spent in the state 
Incentive costs per job in motion picture and 
video production estimated at $52,216.86. 
Significant transfer of taxpayer resources to 




Discrete choice model; 
Location characteristic 
control variables 
Incentives significantly influence location of 
filming; Refundable credits more effective 
than transferrable credits; Over fifty-two 
percent of film production would shift if all 
incentives were removed; Concentration 
would occur as 17 states would gain 
production of films without incentives but 32 
states gain in 2013; No lasting effect of 
incentives if they are removed.  
Revenue negative for states; State revenue 
feedback ranges from low of $0.13 per dollar 
of incentive in Oklahoma to high of $0.77 in 
Texas; Incentive cost per job stimulated 
ranges from high of $24,114 in Missouri to 
low of $1,426 for Texas; Lower than cost of 
directly increasing the number of state 
employees; Attractiveness depends on 
opportunity cost of funds  
SFI-State Film Incentive; QCEW-US Bureau of Labor Statistics Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages 
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Table 4. State Incentive Program Actions 
State Incentive Program Action 
Arizona Adoption-2006; Elimination-2010 
Florida Adoption-2003; Elimination-2016 
Indiana Adoption-2007; Elimination-2011 
Louisiana Adoption-2002; Capped-2015 
Michigan Adoption-2008; Elimination-2015 
New Mexico Adoption-2002 
North Carolina Adoption-2000 
Rhode Island Adoption-2000 
Vermont Adoption-2006; Elimination-2011 





Table 5. State Characteristics 






RPP-Rent BEA rent component of regional price 
parity (2011) 
No Yes 
FMR HUD Fair Market Rent averaged 
across 2, 3 and 4 bedroom apartments 
Yes No 
AMEN USDA ERS Natural amenity scale  Yes Yes 
COLLEGE Census share of the adult population 
25+ with a bachelor’s degree (2000) 
Yes Yes 
WAGE00 BEA nonfarm wage rate in 2000 Yes No 
WAGE11 BEA nonfarm wage rate in 2011 No Yes 
DENSITY Census population density in 2000 Yes Yes 
INDMIX0207 Industry mix employment growth 
2002-2007 (Dorfman et al., 2011) 
No Yes 
INDMIX9802 Industry mix employment growth 
1998-2002 (Bartik et al., 2018) 
Yes No 
ECFREE00 Fraser Economic Freedom Index 2000 Yes No 
ECFREE03 Fraser Economic Freedom Index 2003 No Yes 
BEA-US Bureau of Economic Analysis; HUD-US Department of Housing and Urban Development; USDA-United 




Table 6. Synthetic Control Method Results 
State (Scenario) DID Labor Market Outcome 
Arizona (Eliminate, 2010) Wage = -0.098   Wage=lower by one hundred and 
forty-one percent of 2010 value 
Florida (Eliminate, 2016) Employment = -0.038; 
Wage = -0.073 
Employment=lower by twelve 
percent of 2016 value; Wage=lower 
by thirteen percent of 2016 value 
Indiana (Eliminate, 2011) Employment = -0.055; 
Wage = -0.024 
Employment=lower by eighty-three 
percent of 2011 value; Wage=lower 
by thirty percent of 2011 value 
Louisiana (Adopt, 2002) Employment = 0.309; 
Wage = 0.291 
Employment=higher by two hundred 
and seventy-four percent of 2002 
value; Wage=lower by four hundred 
and twenty-seven percent of the 
2002 value  
Louisiana (Cap, 2015) Wage = -0.683 Wage=lower by forty-three percent 
of 2015 value 
Michigan (Eliminate, 2015) Employment = -0.132; 
Wage = -0.125 
Employment=lower by seventy 
percent of 2015 value; Wage=lower 
by forty-five percent of 2015 value 
New Mexico (Adopt, 2002) Employment = 0.632; 
Wage = 0.66 
Employment=higher by two hundred 
and eighty-six percent of 2002 
value; Wage=higher by three 
hundred and eighty-six percent of 
2002 value 
North Carolina (Adopt, 2000) Employment = 0.009; 
Wage = 0.032 
Employment=higher by eight 
percent of 2000 value; Wage=higher 
by fifty-one percent of 2000 value 
Rhode Island (Adopt, 2000) Employment = 0.257; 
Wage = 0.493 
Employment=higher by three 
hundred and fifty-two percent of 
2000 value; Wage=higher by seven 
hundred and twenty-two percent 
Vermont (Eliminate, 2011) Wage = -0.11 Wage=lower by eighty-six percent 
of the 2011 value 
Wisconsin (Eliminate, 2013) Employment = -0.028; 
Wage = -0.106 
Employment=lower by twenty-
seven percent of 2013 value; 
Wage=lower by one hundred and 





Figure 1. Louisiana Incentive Adoption: LA Employment and Wage vs Synthetic (Synth) 
 
Weights: Employment (MI=0.602, WV=0.221, WY=0.176); Wage (KY=0.434, ID=0.356, OH=0.184, WY=0.018, 
WV=0.008) 
DID: Employment=0.309; Wage=0.291 
 
 
Figure 2. New Mexico Incentive Adoption: NM Employment and Wage vs Synthetic (Synth) 
Weights: Employment (WV=0.6, NV=0.23, ID=0.17); Wage (MI=0.584, ID=0.416) 
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Figure 3. North Carolina Incentive Adoption: NC Employment and Wage vs Synthetic (Synth) 
  
Weights: Employment (IN=0.708, WY=0.181, WV=0.059, OH=0.052); Wage (KS=0.542, KY=0.311, WY=0.09, 
NH=0.05, WI=0.007) 
DID: Employment=0.009; Wage=0.032 
 
 
Figure 4. Rhode Island Incentive Adoption: RI Employment and Wage vs Synthetic (Synth) 
  
Weights: Employment (WY=0.695, WV=0.19, KS=0.114); Wage (KS=0.707, WY=0.232, KY=0.033, OH=0.029) 
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Figure 5. Indiana Incentive Repeal: IN Employment and Wage vs Synthetic (Synth) 
 
Weights: Employment (NC=0.454, MS=0.391, IL=0.118, ME=0.037); Wage (MS=0.571, MN=0.38, IL=0.049) 
DID: Employment=-0.055; Wage=-0.024 
 
Figure 6. Wisconsin Incentive Repeal: WI Employment and Wage vs Synthetic (Synth) 
 
Weights: Employment (NC=0.333, MS=0.306, MD=0.215, ME=0.093, WA=0.053); Wage (SC=0.491, MN=0.361, 
RI=0.094, ME=0.054) 








































Figure 7. Florida Incentive Repeal: FL Employment and Wage vs Synthetic (Synth) 
 
Weights: Employment (TX=0.591, MD=0.194, UT=0.183, GA=0.032); Wage (ME=0.362, UT=0.272, MD=0.252, 
NM=0.039, CT=0.035, GA=0.028, OR=0.012) 
DID: Employment=-0.038; Wage=-0.073 
 
 
Figure 8. Michigan Incentive Repeal: MI Employment and Wage vs Synthetic (Synth) 
 
Weights: Employment (TN=0.345, MS=0.271, MN=0.167, PA=0.159, RI=0.057); Wage (PA=0.297, MS=0.209, 
IL=0.208, NC=0.137, OR=0.086, MN=0.053, TN=0.011) 








































Figure 9. Film Incentive Adoption Placebo Analysis: Employment 
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Figure 11. Film Incentive Repeal Placebo Analysis: Employment 
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